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Effectuating an Impartial Jury of One’s Peers:
Why Washington Has More Work to Do to
Achieve Peremptory Challenge Reform
Rachel Simon*
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
Overtime, limitations have been placed on when peremptory challenges
can be exercised in order to prohibit discriminatory use. To create a truly
impartial jury of a defendant’s peers, peremptory challenge reform is still
needed. Although the Washington Supreme Court adopted General Rule 37
(GR 37)2 to address implicit bias in the use of peremptory challenges in
2018, the conversation around these challenges and reforms has continued
to evolve and Washington should take additional steps to effectuate the
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment.

*J.D. 2021, Seattle University School of Law. I am very appreciative of those who
provided their time and energy in giving me feedback and communicating about this
Note. I am especially grateful to Judge David Keenan for allowing me to observe in his
courtroom and to Professor Elisabeth Semel for sharing the report’s background and
behind-the-scenes work with me. I also want to thank LeighAnne Thompson for her
insightful feedback. Lastly, I want to thank Nat, my family, and friends for their love and
encouragement.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). “[T]he United States Supreme Court has
held that an essential prerequisite to an impartial jury is that it be drawn from a
‘representative cross-section of the community.’” People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 754
(Cal. 1978); JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN
COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS ch. 3 (1977).
2
WASH. CT. G.R. 37 (2018).
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Voir dire is the process of impaneling a jury and is integral to upholding
each individual’s Sixth Amendment right. The purpose of voir dire is to
find and impanel peers who are open-minded and can fairly serve as jurors.3
During voir dire, attorneys ask potential jurors a set of questions relating to
the issues and facts in the case and also attempt to create a favorable
impression with the jurors.4 Attorneys may then eliminate potential jurors
by the use of peremptory challenges. Initially arising “as a means to select a
qualified and unbiased jury,” peremptory challenges have existed nearly as
long as juries.5 Peremptory challenges are “objection[s] to a juror for which
no reason need be given, but upon which the court shall exclude the juror,”6
and are used during voir dire in both civil and criminal trials.7 In Justice
O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., she
described the purpose of peremptory challenges and the private choices that
litigants are able to make in their exercise of a peremptory:
The peremptory challenge “allows parties,” in this case private
parties, to exclude potential jurors. It is the nature of a peremptory
that its exercise is left wholly within the discretion of the litigant.
The purpose of this longstanding practice is to establish for each
party an “arbitrary and capricious species of challenge” whereby
the “sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices were apt to
conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another” may be
acted upon. By allowing the litigant to strike jurors for even the
most subtle of discerned biases, the peremptory challenge fosters
both the perception and reality of an impartial jury. In both
criminal and civil trials, the peremptory challenge is a mechanism
3

WASHINGTON PRACTICE, WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CRIMINAL
§1.01 (4th ed. 2016).
4
WALLACE D. LOH, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, CASES, READINGS,
AND TEXT 387 (1984).
5
Vivien Toomey Montz & Craig Lee Montz, The Peremptory Challenge: Should It Still
Exist? An Examination of Federal and Florida Law, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 451, 454
(2000); see Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished,
65 Temp. L. Rev. 369, 374 (1992).
6
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.44.140 (West Supp. 2003).
7
28 U.S.C.A. § 1870 (West 1948); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
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for the exercise of private choice in the pursuit of fairness. The
peremptory is, by design, an enclave of private action in a
government-managed proceeding.8
As indicated by Justice O’Connor, each individual’s Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury must be held and, in doing so, pursue opportunities
for fairness.9 The purpose of peremptory challenges is to create a jury that
is free from outside or pre-existing biases.10 Yet, through the use of
peremptory challenges, a jury can lose its impartiality because the
challenges are often used to exclude jurors based on attorneys’ pre-existing
biases.11 The overarching goal of pursuing fairness by creating an impartial
jury can thus be undermined if peremptory challenges are used to
discriminatorily exclude potential jurors instead.
Peremptory challenges are intended to help create an impartial jury that is
open-minded and ready to listen to a case’s evidence and the related law.12
Unfortunately, due to the time constraints in conducting voir dire, an

8

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 633–34 (1991) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
9
See id.; WASHINGTON PRACTICE, WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS –
CRIMINAL §1.01 (4th ed. 2016).
10
WASHINGTON PRACTICE, WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CRIMINAL
§1.01 (4th ed. 2016).
11
ELISABETH SEMEL, DAGEN DOWNARD, EMMA TOLMAN, ANNE WEIS, DANIELLE
CRAIG & CHELSEA HANLOCK, WHITEWASHING THE JURY BOX: HOW CALIFORNIA
PERPETUATES THE DISCRIMINATORY EXCLUSION OF BLACK AND LATINX JURORS iv, 2
(2020), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Whitewashing-theJury-Box.pdf [https://perma.cc/B28C-25YW].
12
Richard Gabriel, Understanding Bias: Preserving Peremptory Challenges, Preventing
Their Discriminatory Use, and Providing Fairer and More Impartial Juries, CIVIL JURY
PROJECT AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, https://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/understandingbias-preserving-peremptory-challenges-preventing-their-discriminatory-use-andproviding-fairer-and-more-impartial-juries/ [https://perma.cc/U9PG-AXPR]; see also
Press Release, ACLU, Washington Supreme Court Is First in Nation to Adopt Rule to
Reduce Implicit Racial Bias in Jury Selection: New Rule Addresses Failings of U.S.
Supreme Court Decision (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/washingtonsupreme-court-first-nation-adopt-rule-reduce-implicit-racial-bias-jury
[https://perma.cc/N76F-9FMA] [hereinafter ACLU Press Release].
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attorney’s biases are often at play in their use of a peremptory challenge.13
Implicit and explicit biases in jury selection are not a new issue.14 A
number of cases have been brought before the United States Supreme Court
and other state supreme courts to address the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges.15 These cases exemplify the history of implicit and
explicit bias in jury selection across the nation, which has repeatedly denied
people of color their Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury of their
peers.16 In Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court attempted
to prevent the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by creating a
three-part framework and holding that a prosecutor must come up with a
neutral explanation for using a peremptory challenge.17 However, many
scholars argue that Batson failed to prevent such discriminatory use of the
challenges and the unfair exclusion of jurors of color.18 Numerous cases
since Batson have attempted to address the problems Batson could not solve
regarding race and gender discrimination in jury selection.19 As courts have
13

Gabriel, supra note 12; see also ACLU Press Release, supra note 12.
ACLU Press Release, supra note 12; see also Gabriel, supra note 12.
15
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
511 U.S. 127 (1994); City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124 (Wash. 2017); State v.
Jefferson, 429 P.3d 467 (Wash. 2018); State v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 431 P.3d 850 (Kan.
2018); State v. Berhe, 444 P.3d 1172 (Wash. 2019); State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319 (Iowa
2019).
16
ACLU Press Release, supra note 12; see also Gabriel, supra note 12.
17
See Amy Wilson, Note, The End of Peremptory Challenges: A Call for Change
Through Comparative Analysis, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 363 (2009).
18
See id.; see also Abbe Smith, A Call to Abolish Peremptory Challenges by
Prosecutors, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1163 (2014); Anna Roberts, Disparately Seeking
Jurors: Disparate Impact and the (Mis)use of Batson, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1359
(2012) [hereinafter Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors]; Jean Montoya, The Future of
the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaire and the “Blind”
Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981 (1996).
19
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); see also City of Seattle v.
Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124 (Wash. 2017); State v. Jefferson, 429 P.3d 467 (Wash. 2018);
State v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 431 P.3d 850 (Kan. 2018); State v. Berhe, 444 P.3d 1172
(Wash. 2019); State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319 (Iowa 2019); State v. Gentry, 449 P.3d 707
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2019); State v. Curry, 447 P.3d 7 (Or. Ct. App. 2019); State v. Holmes,
221 A.3d 407 (Conn. 2019); People v. Rhoades, 453 P.3d 89 (Cal. 2019).
14
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attempted to resolve Batson’s shortcomings in regard to peremptory
challenges, states have recognized the need to address discrimination during
voir dire.
The Washington Supreme Court recently adopted a court rule, GR 37,
and became the first court to attempt to address Batson’s limitations by
eliminating both implicit and intentional racial bias in jury selection.20 The
ACLU explained the urgency behind the rule’s creation: “For decades in
Washington state, many people of color have been blocked from
participating fully in our democracy as jurors for reasons unrelated to their
ability to serve.”21 The Washington Supreme Court adopted GR 37 in April
2018 with the hope of increasing diversity in Washington’s juries and
reducing implicit racial bias from the state’s jury selection process.22 GR 37
is not intended to eliminate peremptory challenges but is rather an objection
used to raise issues of improper bias.
The rule requires the party exercising the challenge to articulate the
reasons for the challenge.23 The court then evaluates the reasons given and
“[i]f the court determines that an objective observer could view race or
ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the
peremptory challenge shall be denied. The court need not find purposeful
discrimination to deny the peremptory challenge.”24 The purpose of GR 37
is to prevent the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges and eliminate
the removal of jurors on the basis of their race or ethnicity.25 GR 37
“applies to jury selection in both superior and district courts, and an
objection under the rule can be raised by a party or by the court on its own

20

ACLU Press Release, supra note 12; WASH. CT. G.R. 37 (2018).
ACLU Press Release, supra note 12.
22
Id.
23
WASH. CT. G.R. 37(d) (2018).
24
WASH. CT. G.R. 37(e) (2018).
25
Douglas J. Ende, Peremptory Challenges – Generally – Permissible Grounds,
WASHINGTON PRACTICE – CIVIL PROCEDURE § 29:13, at 222, 227 (3d ed. 2018).
21
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initiative.”26 It remains to be seen whether GR 37 will fill the hole left open
by Batson by combatting implicit bias in the jury selection process.
Since Washington’s enactment of GR 37, other states have also struggled
to address the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.27 These states
are looking to Washington’s example to improve their own jury diversity.
California has even begun the process of implementing similar language28
to that used in Washington’s GR 37. When accounting for racial, economic,
religious, and political diversity, California is the most diverse state in the
United States.29 Like Washington, California has also struggled to address
Batson’s shortcomings and impanel juries that are representative of the
population.30 In late February 2020, the California Supreme Court
acknowledged a need to prevent discrimination occurring during voir dire
and announced a plan to work with judges, prosecutors, defense counsel,
and other practitioners to brainstorm measures to ensure juror diversity.31
Instead of enacting a court rule, California went the legislative route and
adopted Assembly Bill 3070 (AB 3070), which offers California the

26

Id.
See State v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 431 P.3d 850 (Kan. 2018); State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d
319 (Iowa 2019); State v. Gentry, 449 P.3d 707 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019); State v. Curry,
447 P.3d 7 (Or. Ct. App. 2019); State v. Holmes, 221 A.3d 407 (Conn. 2019); People v.
Rhoades, 453 P.3d 89 (Cal. 2019).
28
A.B. 3070, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020).
29
Most
Diverse
States
2020,
WORLD
POPULATION
REV.,
https://worldpopulationreview.com/states/most-diverse-states/ [https://perma.cc/7SVQMSSM].
30
Press Release, Cal. S. Dist. 11, Senator Wiener Announces Bill to Ensure Jury Pools
Reflect
Diversity
of
Community
(Mar.
5,
2017),
https://sd11.senate.ca.gov/news/20170305-senator-wiener-announces-bill-ensure-jurypools-reflect-diversity-community [https://perma.cc/4A3S-NEV9] [hereinafter Senator
Wiener Announces Bill].
31
Nate Gartrell, California Supreme Court to Study Ways to Prevent Discrimination in
Juries: Announcement Follows Call to Action in Contra Costa Murder Case, MERCURY
NEWS (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/02/26/ca-supreme-court-tostudy-ways-to-prevent-discrimination-in-juries-across-the-state/ [https://perma.cc/3NNHNNDS].
27
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opportunity to eliminate discriminatory peremptory challenges.32 With the
changes to peremptory challenges in California and with similar discussions
occurring in other states across the country,33 Washington must remain an
active participant in preventing the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges and in renewing belief in judicial integrity. The onus is now on
the State of Washington to learn from the changes other states are making
to peremptory challenges, to address GR 37’s shortcomings, to make new
suggestions for GR 37 implementation, and to push for a truly impartial
jury once and for all.

II. ROADMAP
In Section III, this Note will examine the background history of
peremptory challenges. This Note will also look at the differences in the use
of the challenges in federal courts and in Washington and California state
courts. Section IV of this Note will ask why implicit bias matters in jury
selection and discuss how implicit biases relate to the exercise of
peremptory challenges.
In Section V, this Note will then analyze key changes to peremptory
challenges through case law, highlighting the importance of Batson. This
portion will also address the changes to peremptory challenges that
occurred before and after Batson in Swain v. Alabama and in J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., respectively. Section VI of this Note will discuss the
unique process for drafting and enacting GR 37 in Washington. This
portion will provide the language of GR 37, the purpose of the rule, and the
goal of the drafters. Section VI will then examine how an Iowa case has

32
A.B. 3070, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020); see also SEMEL ET AL., supra
note 11, at 70.
33
See, e.g., State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319 (Iowa 2019); State v. Gentry, 449 P.3d 707
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2019); State v. Curry, 447 P.3d 7 (Or. Ct. App. 2019); State v. Holmes,
221 A.3d 407 (Conn. 2019); People v. Rhoades, 453 P.3d 89 (Cal. 2019).
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referenced GR 37 and the need for the state to follow Washington’s lead in
implementing peremptory challenge reform.
In Section VII, this Note will use California as an example of a state that
has followed Washington’s lead in peremptory challenge reform. This Note
will discuss California’s reliance on GR 37 in addressing the discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges. The current language of GR 37 and
application of GR 37 in California’s AB 3070 will be used as a framework
to provide suggestions for where Washington needs to go from here.
Section VII will also discuss the differences between California’s AB 3070
and Washington’s GR 37.
In section VIII, this Note will address how Washington must stay active
in implementing peremptory challenge reform. This section will also
examine another method for increasing diversity in juror representation by
paying jurors at a higher rate per diem. Finally, section IX will conclude the
Note.

III. BACKGROUND HISTORY OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND THE
USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL AND STATE
COURTS
A. A Brief History of Peremptory Challenges
Peremptory challenges have long been associated with the right to a jury
trial, yet, the original construction of the challenges and reasons underlying
the existence of peremptory challenges are largely unknown.34
There has been a kind of mythic genealogy constructed about the
peremptory challenge . . . [T]he idea of the peremptory challenge
is old, but it is not nearly as old, deep, or widespread as the notion
of the jury itself. Its ancient association with the right to trial by

34

Montz & Montz, supra note 5, at 454–55.
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jury has cloaked it with a presumption of legitimacy bordering on,
but never quite reaching, the constitutional.35
Though their exact origins are mysterious, peremptory challenges
eventually came to the United States by way of the English jury system.36
The English jury system, used by the English Crown as a method to select
informed witnesses, began after the Norman Conquest in the eleventh
century.37 By the end of the thirteenth century, “[t]he crown subsequently
began exercising unlimited peremptory challenges in capital cases, while
the defendant was entitled to only thirty-five.”38 In 1305, parliament
revoked the Crown’s right to unlimited peremptory challenges.39 The
Crown was instead required to show cause for each challenge, and this led
to a repudiation of the prosecutor’s right to use a peremptory challenge in
England.40 Defendants retained their right to use peremptory challenges in
felony trials.41 Eventually, the use of the challenges in English criminal
trials decreased until they were abolished as a method of jury selection in
1989.42
The American colonies adopted the British peremptory challenges, and
subsequently, the challenges were incorporated into the federal courts and
court rules of every state.43 “[T]he right of the defendant to exercise
peremptory challenges ‘was accepted as part of the common law.’”44
Initially, prosecutors were not allowed to use peremptory challenges, as the
challenges were predominantly viewed as a shield mechanism for
35

Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s
Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 812 (1997).
36
Montz & Montz, supra note 5, at 454; see LOH, supra note 4, at 386.
37
Montz & Montz, supra note 5, at 454; see LOH, supra note 4, at 386.
38
Montz & Montz, supra note 5, at 454; see Hoffman, supra note 35, at 819–820.
39
Montz & Montz, supra note 5, at 455; see LOH, supra note 4, at 386.
40
Montz & Montz, supra note 5, at 455; see LOH, supra note 4, at 386.
41
Montz & Montz, supra note 5, at 455; see Hoffman, supra note 35, at 822.
42
Montz & Montz, supra note 5, at 455; see Hoffman, supra note 35, at 822.
43
Montz & Montz, supra note 5, at 455; see Broderick, supra note 5.
44
SEMEL ET AL., supra note 11; see also Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge:
Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1719 n.21 (1977).
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defendants to use to remove conviction-prone jurors.45 Colonial courts also
debated how many peremptory challenges should be allowed; with the
permitted number challenges ranging from unlimited to none.46 Eventually,
prosecutors gained the right to use peremptory challenges in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries even though the ability to use a
peremptory was not guaranteed by the Constitution.47
B. Peremptory Challenges in Federal Courts
Although the Constitution does not confer a right to use peremptory
challenges, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized
peremptory challenges as a means to obtaining an impartial jury.48 The
challenges are not protected by the federal constitution and are instead
permitted by state statute or court rule.49 The language of the state statutes
and court rules regarding peremptory challenges is considerably varied.
One constant is when peremptory challenges are used: during jury selection,
or voir dire.50 Peremptory challenges are used in both federal and state
courts and the number of available peremptory challenges varies based on
the type of case, ranging from three to twenty challenges.51 In the federal
system, peremptory challenges are often exercised at the end of voir dire,
with each side submitting its strikes to the judge without knowing the other

45

Montz & Montz, supra note 5, at 455; LOH, supra note 4, at 386; see also Hoffman,
supra note 35, at 823.
46
Hoffman, supra note 35, at 823; see also Montz & Montz, supra note 5, at 455; LOH,
supra note 4, at 386.
47
Montz & Montz, supra note 5, at 455; Note, supra note 44; see also Holland v.
Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 518 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48
Montz & Montz, supra note 5, at 455–56; see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614, 633 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
49
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.44.210 (West Supp. 2003).
50
WASHINGTON PRACTICE, WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CRIMINAL
§1.01 (4th ed. 2016).
51
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
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side’s strikes and exercising their challenges blindly.52 Conversely, in state
courts, peremptories are generally exercised in a sequence, and both sides
take turns and have the opportunity to hear the strikes made by the opposing
side.53 For example, in a civil case in Washington, the plaintiff is given the
first chance to use a peremptory challenge to excuse a juror.54 The
defendant may then use a challenge, and the two parties continue
alternating until the peremptory challenges are exhausted.55
The number of peremptory challenges that are available to each party
differs depending on whether the case is civil or criminal, and the number
of peremptories varies if the case is heard in a state or federal court.56 Under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District
Court, Rule 24 provides the guidelines for peremptory challenges:
(b) Peremptory Challenges. Each side is entitled to the number of
peremptory challenges to prospective jurors specified below. The
court may allow additional peremptory challenges to multiple
defendants, and may allow the defendants to exercise those
challenges separately or jointly.
(1) Capital Case. Each side has 20 peremptory challenges when
the government seeks the death penalty.
(2) Other Felony Case. The government has 6 peremptory
challenges and the defendant or defendants jointly have 10
52
See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 25 F.3d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding the use
of the blind strike method, in which the parties simultaneously exercise peremptory
challenges to the jury panel without knowing which jurors their opponent struck, did not
impair the defendant’s full use of his or her peremptory challenges); United States v.
Harper, 33 F.3d 1143, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 1994) (describing the blind-strike system
utilized in the case); United States v. Bermudez, 529 F.3d 158, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2008)
(holding the blind strike method did not violate the defendant’s rights to due process and
noting “all five circuits have considered similar challenges to the blind strike method and
have upheld it as constitutional and consistent with Rule 24(b).”).
53
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.44.210 (West Supp. 2003).
54
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.44.210 (West Supp. 2003).
55
Id.
56
Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b), with FED. R. CIV. P. 48(a), and WASH. SUPER. CT.
CRIM. R. 6.4(e) (2015).
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peremptory challenges when the defendant is charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than one year.
(3) Misdemeanor Case. Each side has 3 peremptory challenges
when the defendant is charged with a crime punishable by fine,
imprisonment of one year or less, or both.57
In state courts, permitted peremptory challenges also differ in number
depending on the jurisdiction and court rule in place.58 The number of
peremptory challenges can also increase if an alternate juror is impaneled,
though the number of additional challenges varies. Overall, the variance in
number of allowed peremptory challenges is related to the severity of the
case and restricted by the state’s statute or court rule.
C. Peremptory Challenges in Washington State Courts
Washington Revised Code § 2.36.080(1) addresses a prohibition on
being excluded from jury service and states: “A citizen shall not be
excluded from jury service in this state on account of race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, or economic status.”59 The statute is not intended to
apply specifically to the exercise of peremptory challenges, but instead
focuses on a related issue of prohibiting the exclusion of an individual from
being called to report for jury duty for a discriminatory reason.60 In fact, the
statute on its face gives deference to the exercise of peremptory
challenges.61
57

Id.
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-33-203 (West) (stating each party shall have three
peremptory challenges); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 47 (stating each side is entitled to four
peremptory challenges); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-241 (West) (stating each party
may challenge peremptorily three jurors); 735 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1106 (stating
each side shall be entitled to five peremptory challenges); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH.
234A, § 67B (West) (holding in a civil case each party shall be entitled to four
peremptory challenges); TEX. R. CIV. P. RULE 233 (stating each party to a civil action is
entitled to six peremptory challenges).
59
WASH. REV. CODE § 2.36.080(1) (2018); Ende, supra note 25.
60
WASH. REV. CODE § 2.36.080(4) (2018).
61
Ende, supra note 25.
58
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Peremptory challenges are regulated by Washington court rules, which
state that peremptories may not be used to exclude potential jurors on the
basis of race or ethnicity.62 Under the Washington Superior Court Criminal
Rules, Rule 6.4(e) defines peremptory challenges and outlines the use of the
challenges in Washington courts:
A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which there
is no reason given, but upon which the court shall exclude the
juror. In prosecutions for capital offenses the defense and the state
may challenge peremptorily 12 jurors each; in prosecution for
offenses punishable by imprisonment in the state Department of
Corrections 6 jurors each; in all other prosecutions, 3 jurors each.
When several defendants are on trial together, each defendant shall
be entitled to one challenge in addition to the number of challenges
provided above, with discretion in the trial judge to afford the
prosecution such additional challenges as circumstances warrant.63
Washington courts provide each party with the same number of peremptory
challenges. Like other federal and state courts, Washington courts allow for
a higher number of peremptory challenges as the severity of the possible
penalty increases.64 Rule 6.4 also provides guidelines for how peremptory
challenges shall be exercised by both parties in Washington courts:
After prospective jurors have been passed for cause, peremptory
challenges shall be exercised alternately first by the prosecution
then by each defendant until the peremptory challenges are
exhausted or the jury accepted. Acceptance of the jury as presently
constituted shall not waive any remaining peremptory challenges
to jurors subsequently called.65
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64
65

Id.
WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 6.4(e) (2015).
Id.; see also CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 231(a).
WASH. SUPER CT. CRIM. R. 6.4(e) (2015).
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Like other state courts, Washington courts have each party to the case
alternate as they use their peremptory challenges.66 Although the nature of
exercising a peremptory and the number of peremptories has remained
fairly consistent in Washington, over time, the content of what constitutes a
peremptory challenge has evolved.67 Peremptory challenges can no longer
be executed for excluding jurors on the basis of their race or gender or for
other discriminatory reasons.68 The changes to peremptory challenges have
occurred incrementally over time.69
D. Peremptory Challenges in California State Courts
In criminal cases in California where the offense charged is punishable
by death or with life imprisonment, the defendant and the people are
allowed to exercise twenty peremptory challenges.70 In trials for other
offenses, each side is allowed ten peremptory challenges.71 If the crime is
punishable by imprisonment for one year or less, then each party is entitled
to six peremptory challenges.72 In civil cases in California, each side is
entitled to six peremptory challenges.73 The California Civil Courtroom
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Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 4.44.210 (2020); Michael Paul Thomas, Nature and
Purpose, CALIFORNIA CIVIL COURTROOM HANDBOOK AND DESKTOP REFERENCE §
29:25 (2019 ed.).
67
Ende, supra note 25.
68
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1976) (holding invalid peremptory challenges
based on discriminatory reasons); see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008)
(holding the defendant was entitled to a new trial because the prosecution’s justification
for using a peremptory challenge to dismiss an African-American juror was insufficient);
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding peremptory challenges
could not be used to strike potential jurors solely on the basis of their gender).
69
See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1976); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472
(2008); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); City of Seattle v. Erickson,
398 P.3d 1124 (Wash. 2017); State v. Jefferson, 429 P.3d 467 (Wash. 2018); State v.
Gonzalez-Sandoval, 431 P.3d 850 (Kan. 2018); State v. Berhe, 444 P.3d 1172 (Wash.
2019); State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319 (Iowa 2019).
70
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231(a) (2017).
71
Id.
72
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231(b) (2017).
73
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231(c) (2017).
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Handbook and Desktop Reference outlines the nature and purpose of
peremptory challenges:
No reason need be given for challenging a juror peremptorily, and
the court must exclude any juror so challenged. Thus, peremptory
challenges have historically served as a valuable safety valve in
jury selection. They allow a party to remove from the jury panel
those who have individual characteristics which the party believes
might make the potential juror sympathetic to the opposing party.
Indeed, peremptory challenges may be properly used to excuse
prospective jurors based on “hunches,” and even “arbitrary”
exclusion is permitted as long as not based on impermissible group
bias.74
California’s guiding courtroom handbook hints at how peremptory
challenges may be used based on implicit and explicit biases held by the
attorneys, but neglects to specifically acknowledge such biases.75 Rather,
the handbook mentions “individual characteristics which the party believes
might make the potential juror sympathetic to the opposing party.”76 This
language permitted attorneys in California to excuse jurors based on
discriminatory preconceived biases and a “hunch” that the juror will be
sympathetic to the opposing party. This use of peremptory challenges is
exactly what California addressed in AB 307077 based on the changes
Washington applied by enacting GR 37.78
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Michael Paul Thomas, Nature and Purpose, CALIFORNIA CIVIL COURTROOM
HORNBOOK AND DESKTOP REFERENCE § 29:23 (2019 ed.).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
A.B. 3070, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020).
78
Interview with Elisabeth Semel, Clinical Professor of Law and Director of Berkley
Law’s Death Penalty Clinic (Jul. 2, 2020).
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IV. WHY DOES IMPLICIT BIAS MATTER WHEN SITTING ON A JURY
AND HOW DO IMPLICIT BIASES RELATE TO THE USE OF
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES?
Implicit biases are often discriminatory and are composed of both
subconscious attitudes that an individual has about a particular group and
stereotypes that an individual associates with a particular group.79
Individuals frequently do not even realize that they are harboring the biases
because the biases can be very subtle.80 Implicit biases are deeply engrained
in an individual’s patterns of behavior and therefore are hard to consciously
detect. For instance, an individual may have an implicit bias about another
person’s age, gender, race, nationality, sexual orientation, religious beliefs,
social status, body weight, disability, or other social identity.81 Examples of
implicit bias include associating a Black person with being a criminal or
associating a woman with being weak.
In Washington, potential jurors are instructed about the importance of
discharging their duties without perpetuating discrimination.82 Jurors are
specifically directed that “bias regarding the race, color, religious beliefs,
national origin, sexual orientation, gender, or disability of any party, any
witnesses, and the lawyers should play no part in the exercise of [their]
judgment throughout the trial, and that these [biases] are called ‘conscious

79

Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror
Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 833 (2012)) [hereinafter Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury]; see
Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,
94 Calif. L. Rev. 945, 948–51 (2006).
80
Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury, supra note 79, at 833; see Anthony G. Greenwald &
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and
Stereotypes, 102 PSYCH. REV. 4 (1995); see also Anthony G. Greenwald et al., A Unified
Theory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-Esteem and Self-Concept, 109 PSYCH.
REV. 3 (2002).
81
Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury, supra note 79, at 833; see also SEMEL ET AL., supra
note
11,
at
30;
Education:
About
the
IAT,
PROJECT IMPLICIT,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/iatdetails.html [https://perma.cc/V2UF-F2YC].
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WASHINGTON PRACTICE, WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CRIMINAL
§1.01 (4th ed. 2016).
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biases.’”83 The instruction to potential jurors also notes the presence of a
more subtle tendency at work, implicit biases, and how those biases are also
prohibited in the performance of their role as a juror:
In our daily lives, there are many issues that require us to make
quick decisions and then move on. In making these daily
decisions, we may well rely upon generalities, even what might be
called biases or prejudices. That may be appropriate as a coping
mechanism in our busy daily lives but bias and prejudice can play
no part in any decisions you might make as a juror. Your decisions
as jurors must be based solely upon an open-minded, fair
consideration of the evidence that comes before you during trial.84
Implicit biases can inhibit the ability of a juror to view the case and the
accompanying facts with an open mind and can present difficulties for the
juror as they try to pay close attention to both parties. A juror is tasked with
listening to both parties present the case and ultimately making a decision
that will impact many lives. If, while a juror is listening, they are focusing
on their own preconceived notions of individuals acting in a certain way,
the juror is allowing their preconceived biases to enter into the trial.
Attorneys are also impacted by their implicit biases and rely on their own
biases regarding potential jurors in their exercise of a peremptory
challenge.85 Because implicit biases occur unconsciously, they are harder to
detect, and a juror or attorney may not realize that they even harbor such
thoughts.
An attorney who holds implicit biases is also concerning because of the
potential impact and interplay of those biases on the attorney’s use of
peremptory challenges. “Social science research has illuminated the direct
impact that implicit biases have on the exercise of peremptory strikes.”86
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Id.
Id.
85
Caren Myers Morrison, Negotiating Peremptory Challenges, 104 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 32 (2014).
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SEMEL ET AL., supra note 11, at 30; see also Morrison, supra note 85, at 32.
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Caren Morrison, an Associate Professor of Law at Georgia State University,
explained that “because of the ‘wide dissociative gap between what we
believe our feelings to be and what they actually are,’ a lawyer’s inability to
assess how a ‘juror’s race has affected her decision to strike’ also means
that ‘she will be unable to explain it.’”87 Implicit biases may be connected
to an attorney’s use of race-based peremptory challenges, which may result
in an attorney’s inability to explain their exercise of the challenge.88 The
attorney will not want to admit to the court that the strike was exercised due
to a race-based reason and may not even be able to do so because of their
dissociation, resulting with the attorney making up a different non-racebased reason to preserve their challenge.89
Jury selection is intended to determine whether a potential juror
possesses the open frame of mind that is necessary to fairly serve as a juror
and this encompasses implicit and explicit biases.90 Yet, peremptory
challenges can be discriminatorily used by prosecutors who attempt to
justify the challenges based on their implicit or explicit biases. If implicit
and explicit biases can no longer be used to provide justifications for
excluding a juror based on their race or ethnicity, then challenge-users will
be forced to look for non-discriminatory explanations for their exclusion.
GR 37 incorporates the fact that implicit and explicit biases can perpetuate
discrimination and is intended to return voir dire to the creation of an
impartial jury. While GR 37 inspired other states, like California, to follow
suit, Washington must still work to eliminate these biases from having a
detrimental impact in the courtroom.

87

SEMEL ET AL., supra note 11, at 30; see also Morrison, supra note 85, at 32.
Morrison, supra note 85, at 32.
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V. HOW THE USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES HAS CHANGED
THROUGH CASE LAW
A. Prior to Batson: Swain v. Alabama (1965)
Before Batson, the controlling view on peremptory challenges was
decided by the United States Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama. In
Swain, the Supreme Court highlighted that “[t]he function of the
[peremptory] challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on
both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the
case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not
otherwise.”91 The Court determined that the ordinary exercise of
peremptory challenges does not by itself imply purposeful discrimination
and the challenges could be used to exclude “any group of otherwise
qualified jurors in any given case, whether they be Negroes, Catholics,
accountants or those with blue eyes.”92 Swain also shifted the burden to the
defendant to show the prosecutor’s systematic use of peremptory challenges
against Black people over a period of time.93 Swain put the onus on
defendants to raise the occurrence of discrimination rather than forcing the
prosecutors to immediately provide a reason for their peremptory. In doing
so, it is unsurprising that Swain both failed to prohibit discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges and also allowed for many convictions of Black
defendants by all-white juries. Thus, Swain left open the possibility that
peremptory challenges could be discriminatory and without justification.94
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Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
Id. at 212.
Id. at 227.
See Gabriel, supra note 12.
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B. Batson v. Kentucky (1986)
1. The Facts of Batson v. Kentucky
Twenty years after Swain, the United States Supreme Court began to
reassess the problems of race and gender discrimination in jury selection.95
Batson remains a case that is often referenced for its attempt and ultimate
failure at eliminating racial bias in jury selection.96 The case involved the
trial of a Black man in Kentucky, in which the prosecutor used his
peremptory challenges to strike all four Black people on the jury, leaving a
jury that was composed of only white people.97 The petitioner was
convicted, and the case was brought before the Supreme Court on the issue
of whether the prosecutor’s use of their peremptory challenges to strike all
four potential Black jurors violated the petitioner’s right to have a jury
drawn from a cross section of the community under the Sixth Amendment
and §11 of the Kentucky Constitution.98 The Court also considered whether
the facts of the case showed that the prosecutor had in fact engaged in a
“pattern” of discriminatory challenges and therefore established an equal
protection violation under Swain.99
2. The Batson Court’s Holding and Subsequent Acknowledgement of
Purposeful Discrimination in the Use of Peremptory Challenges
In Batson, the Court found that “[p]urposeful racial discrimination in
selection of the venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection
because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to
secure.”100 The Court in Batson further reflected on the importance of a
jury, finding that juries are intended to be “composed of the peers or equals
95

Montoya, supra note 18, at 981–82.
See Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors, supra note 18; see also Montoya, supra note
18, at 981.
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Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82–83 (1986).
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Id. at 83.
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Id. at 83–84.
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Id. at 86.
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of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine” and
that jurors must be “indifferently chosen” for the defendant’s right to
“protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice” to be
upheld.101 For a juror to be competent, they must be able to impartially
consider evidence that is presented at trial.102 Therefore, a juror’s race does
not dictate their fitness as a juror.103 The discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges that results in racial discrimination in jury selection is harmful to
not only the accused, whose life and liberty is at stake, but also to the
excluded juror and the community at large who have now had their
confidence in the jury selection process undermined.104
In Batson, the State’s use of peremptory challenges was subject to the
confines of the Equal Protection Clause; therefore, the Court found that the
prosecutor was not unlimited in their exercise of peremptory challenges.105
The Court specifically highlighted how prosecutors could no longer use any
reason to exclude a potential juror:
Although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise permitted
peremptory challenges “for any reason at all, as long as that reason
is related to his view concerning the outcome” of the case to be
tried, the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to
challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the
assumption that [B]lack jurors as a group will be unable
impartially to consider the State’s case against a [B]lack
defendant.106
The Court also rejected Swain’s requirement that the defendant bear the
evidentiary burden to show a prosecutor’s systematic discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges, finding that the evidentiary requirement placed a
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crippling burden of proof on defendants.107 Swain had provided a result that
was inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all108 by requiring
evidence of several instances of discrimination before one defendant could
raise an objection that the peremptory challenges were being used for a
discriminatory purpose.109 Instead, the Court found that a defendant need
only rely solely on the facts concerning the racially discriminatory use of
the peremptory challenges in the defendant’s own case as opposed to
requiring a defendant to show that several others suffered discrimination
before being able to object.110 With the new Batson rule, once the defendant
is able to make a prima facie showing based on the facts of purposeful
discrimination in jury selection, the burden shifts to the State to provide a
neutral explanation for challenging jurors.111
3. Batson’s Implications for Peremptory Challenges
Batson is important because the Court recognized that peremptory
challenges have been used to discriminate against Black and other
underrepresented jurors and noted a need for change in the use of the
challenges. The Court also emphasized how confidence in the criminal
justice system would be influenced by increasing the population
representations in those who report for jury service and decreasing
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges:
By requiring trial courts to be sensitive to the racially
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, our decision enforces
the mandate of equal protection and furthers the ends of justice. In
view of the heterogenous population of our Nation, public respect
for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will be
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strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury
service because of his race.112
Because the petitioner in Batson had made a timely objection to the
prosecutor’s removal of all potential Black jurors and the trial court’s
rejection of the objection did not include a requirement of the prosecutor to
explain his actions, the Court determined that the case should be
remanded.113
Batson provided a remedy for defendants in the case of intentional
discrimination by establishing a three-step test.114 The Batson test requires
(1) the objecting party to establish a sufficient showing or a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination; (2) the trial court to agree that the
objecting party has made such a showing, at which point the burden shifts
to the party making the strike to provide a “race-neutral” reason; and (3) the
trial court to decide whether the objecting party has established purposeful
discrimination.115 Though the Court attempted to curb purposeful racially
discriminatory uses of peremptory challenges, Justice Marshall, concurring
in Batson, predicted that the Court’s decision would not end race
discrimination in jury selection primarily because a trial court would have
difficulty assessing a lawyer’s motives to exclude a potential juror.116
Justice Marshall felt so strongly he even claimed that “[t]he inherent
potential of peremptory challenges to distort the jury process by permitting
the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should ideally lead the Court to
ban them entirely from the criminal justice system.”117 Many legal scholars
and commentators have echoed Justice Marshall’s concerns regarding
peremptory challenges, and evidence supports Marshall’s prediction that
lawyers would offer feeble excuses for their discriminatory peremptory
112
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challenges that would be accepted by courts.118 Such feeble excuses given
by prosecutors who continue to use peremptory challenges discriminatorily
long after Batson gave rise to Washington’s own change to peremptory
challenges through GR 37.
C. Post-Batson: J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994)
Other cases have continued to address Batson’s shortcomings in
decreasing racial and gender discrimination using peremptory challenges in
jury selection.119 In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., the United States
Supreme Court noted that since Batson, progress had been made to provide
jury selection procedures that were fair and nondiscriminatory.120 Further,
the Court “recognized that whether the trial is criminal or civil, potential
jurors, as well as litigants, have an equal protection right to jury selection
procedures that are free from state-sponsored group stereotypes rooted in,
and reflective of, historical prejudice.”121 In J.E.B., the Supreme Court
examined whether intentional discrimination on the basis of gender is
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause and ultimately found that
“gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and
impartiality.”122 The Court highlighted the fact that “[d]iscrimination in jury
selection, whether based on race or on gender, causes harm to the litigants,
the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from
participation in the judicial process,” noting that there is a potential for the
prejudice that motivated the peremptory challenge to impact the entire
proceeding.
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Similar to the negative impacts on the community noted in Batson, the
Court found that the community’s confidence in the impartiality of the jury
is undermined by the prosecutor’s continued perpetuation of group
stereotypes in the courtroom.123 The Court further determined that
prohibiting the use of peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors solely
on the basis of their gender did not imply that peremptory challenges should
be eliminated as an element of jury selection.124 Additionally, the Court
found that the prohibition did not conflict with the legitimate purpose of
using peremptory challenges to ensure a fair and impartial jury.125 With the
prohibition in place, jurors can still be removed, by way of a peremptory
challenge, for another reason, as long as gender is not the predominant
grounds for the removal.126 The Court was opposed to eliminating jurors
solely on the basis of their gender and identified how failing to protect
against gender discrimination could also frustrate the purpose of Batson:
Because gender and race are overlapping categories, gender can be
used as a pretext for racial discrimination. Allowing parties to
remove racial minorities from the jury not because of their race,
but because of their gender, contravenes well-established equal
protection principles and could insulate effectively racial
discrimination from judicial scrutiny.127
In J.E.B., the Court also highlighted that all citizens, regardless of race,
ethnicity, or gender, should have an equal opportunity to partake directly in
our democracy by sitting on a jury.128 Therefore, the Court supported the
prohibition of using gender as a basis for a peremptory challenge because
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the integrity of the judicial system is compromised if people are excluded
from participating as a juror solely because of their race or gender.129
Although J.E.B. added a prohibition of gender as a basis for peremptory
challenges to Batson, using gender and race as an explicit basis for a
peremptory challenge is not the only way that litigants can discriminate
against potential jurors. In fact, litigants continue to subconsciously
discriminate on the basis of race and gender in their use of peremptory
challenges because of their implicit biases. The Washington Supreme Court
enacted GR 37 in the hope of preventing implicit bias from affecting the use
of peremptory challenges.
D. Post-Batson: City of Seattle v. Erickson
In City of Seattle v. Erickson, the Washington Supreme Court considered
whether the defendant, Erickson, could bring a Batson challenge after the
jury was empaneled and the rest of the venire excused.130 Erickson, a Black
man, was charged with unlawful use of a weapon.131 After voir dire, the
City of Seattle exercised a peremptory challenge against the only Black
juror on the jury panel.132 The jury was then empaneled, and after the jury
and the rest of the venire had left the courthouse, Erickson objected to the
peremptory challenge, claiming the strike was racially motivated.133 In the
decision, the court noted “‘Batson . . . appears to have created a “crippling
burden,” making it very difficult for defendants to prove discrimination
even where it almost certainly exists.’ This underscores the need to amend
our procedures and ensure that jury selection is more secure from the threat
of racial prejudice.”134
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The Washington Supreme Court held if there is a peremptory strike of a
juror who is the only member of a cognizable racial group, then the exercise
of the peremptory challenge itself constitutes a prima facie showing of
racial motivation.135 The trial court is required to ask for a race-neutral
reason from the striking party, and then the court is tasked with determining
whether the peremptory challenge was exercised in a discriminatory manner
based on the facts and circumstances.136 In the decision, the Washington
Supreme Court also noted that pending before the court in its administrative
rule-making capacity, though not yet enacted, was a “proposed court rule
that would alter the method for evaluating claims of race-based peremptory
challenges so that the intentional discrimination that must be proved under
Batson is no longer required.”137
In mentioning the proposed rule, GR 37, the court noted the fact that the
rule would “create a presumption against the validity of justifications such
as ‘expressing a distrust of law enforcement or a belief that law
enforcement officers engage in racial profiling’” that were previously
allowed in Batson.138 In Erickson’s case, the court determined that his
objections were timely, and the municipal court erred when it failed to infer
racial bias from the dismissal of the only Black juror on the jury panel.139
Erickson portrays the evolution of peremptory challenges and how the
challenges are still being used in a discriminatory manner. Significantly,
Erickson notes how court rules such as GR 37 can address Batson’s
shortcomings and begin to eliminate the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges.
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VI. DRAFTING AND ENACTING GENERAL RULE 37
GR 37 was originally drafted in 2015 by American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) Deputy Legal Director Jeffery Robinson, American Civil Liberties
Union

of

Washington’s

(ACLU-WA)

Nancy

Talner,

ACLU-WA

Cooperating Attorney Lila Silverstein, and La Rond Baker, in addition to
other cooperating attorneys.140 As support for the rule increased, the
Washington Supreme Court requested that other organizations serve on a
working group to help fine-tune the rule’s language.141 The attorneys who
crafted the rule acknowledged that “minority racial and ethnic groups are
disproportionately represented in Washington state’s court, prison, and jail
populations, relative to their share of the state’s general population” and
this required addressing disproportionalities across the criminal justice
system.142 The ACLU-WA submitted a proposal for GR 37, and the
Washington Supreme Court published the rule for comment in November
2016 with the comment period ending April 30, 2017.143 The rule was then
examined by the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys and the
ACLU, as well as other organizations, judges, and individual attorneys.144
A work group was then formed to generate cohesive language, and the work
group submitted a new version of GR 37 in a final report in February of
2018.145 The Washington Supreme Court adopted most of the work group’s
proposed GR 37 on April 5, 2018.146 GR 37 was published and became
effective on April 24, 2018.147 In enacting GR 37, Washington became the
first state to tackle racial bias in the jury selection process through a court
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rule.148 The drafters and advocates hope that the rule will “lead to fewer allwhite juries—and, consequently, fairer trials”149 by expanding the
prohibitions against using race based peremptory strikes during voir dire
and forcing strike users to look beyond their implicit and explicit biases.150
A. The Language of Washington’s GR 37 and the Goals of the Rule’s
Drafters
GR 37 makes it more difficult to use a peremptory challenge to dismiss a
juror based on their race or ethnicity, whether or not discrimination is the
stated intent of the party issuing the challenge.151 GR 37 states that a party
or the court may raise an objection to a peremptory challenge if they believe
the challenge is motivated by improper bias.152 To determine the validity of
the challenge, GR 37 states in part the following:
(e) Determination. The court shall then evaluate the reasons given
to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the
circumstances. If the court determines that an objective observer
could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the
peremptory challenge, then the peremptory challenge shall be
denied. The court need not find purposeful discrimination to deny
the peremptory challenge. The court should explain its ruling on
the record.
(f) Nature of Observer. For purposes of this rule, an objective
observer is aware that implicit, institutional, and unconscious
biases, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in
the unfair exclusion of potential jurors in Washington State.
148

Imani Gandy, Washington Supreme Court Passes New Rule to Tackle the State’s All
White
Jury
Problem,
REWIRE
NEWS
(Apr.
11,
2018),
https://rewire.news/ablc/2018/04/11/washington-supreme-court-passes-new-rule-tacklestates-white-jury-problem/ [https://perma.cc/7NPL-UNYA].
149
Id.
150
ACLU Press Release, supra note 12.
151
Justice Mary I. Yu, How Injustice and Inequality Have Been Addressed (And
Sometimes Ignored) by the Washington Supreme Court, 54 GONZ. L. REV. 155, 164
(2019).
152
WASH. CT. G.R. 37 (2018).
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(g) Circumstances Considered. In making its determination, the
circumstances the court should consider include, but are not
limited to, the following: (i) the number and types of questions
posed to the prospective juror, which may include consideration of
whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge failed to
question the prospective juror about the alleged concern or the
types of questions asked about it; (ii) whether the party exercising
the peremptory challenge asked significantly more questions or
different questions of the potential juror against whom the
peremptory challenge was used in contrast to other jurors; (iii)
whether other prospective jurors provided similar answers but
were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party; (iv)
whether a reason might be disproportionately associated with a
race or ethnicity; and (v) if the party has used peremptory
challenges disproportionately against a given race or ethnicity, in
the present case or in past cases.
(h) Reasons Presumptively Invalid. Because historically the
following reasons for peremptory challenges have been associated
with improper discrimination in jury selection in Washington
State, the following are presumptive invalid reasons for a
peremptory challenge: (i) having prior contact with law
enforcement officers; (ii) expressing a distrust of law enforcement
or a belief that law enforcement officers engage in racial profiling;
(iii) having a close relationship with people who have been
stopped, arrested, or convicted of a crime; (iv) living in a highcrime neighborhood; (v) having a child outside of marriage; (vi)
receiving state benefits; and (vii) not being a native English
speaker.
(i) Reliance on Conduct. The following reasons for peremptory
challenges also have historically been associated with improper
discrimination in jury selection in Washington State: allegations
that the prospective juror was sleeping, inattentive, staring or
failing to make eye contact, exhibited a problematic attitude, body
language, or demeanor, or provided unintelligent or confused
answers. If any party intends to offer one of these reasons or a
similar reasons as the justification for a peremptory challenge, that
party must provide reasonable notice to the court and the other
parties so the behavior can be verified and addressed in a timely
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manner. A lack of corroboration by the judge or opposing counsel
verifying the behavior shall invalidate the given reason for the
peremptory challenge.153
Though racial discrimination is already unconstitutional, GR 37 “outlaws
peremptory challenges based on ‘implicit, institutional, and unconscious’
race and ethnic biases.”154 Prior to the enactment of GR 37, prosecutors
were able to claim that a juror had a poor attitude, or that they seemed
uninterested, nervous, indecisive, or bewildered, and use those reasons to
strike the juror. (All of these reasons have been accepted by federal courts
across the country.)155 The hope of the drafters was that GR 37 “[would]
reduce the damage done by racial and ethnic bias to the integrity of our
judicial system and to communities of color.”156 GR 37 permits objections
to peremptory challenges that go beyond purposeful discrimination, and
such objections can now be made if an objective observer could view race
or ethnicity as a factor in the use of a peremptory strike.157 After Batson,
peremptory challenges, when objected to on the basis of race
discrimination, were often defended with reasons for excluding potential
jurors that historically have been associated with race bias, such as
demeanor-based justifications.158 GR 37 makes such reasons presumptively
invalid because demeanor-based justifications are often borne of implicit

153
WASH. CT. G.R. 37 (2018). Many of these examples of conduct and reasons for a
peremptory being presumptively invalid originated from prior cases where such
comments were used by prosecutors to discriminatorily excuse potential jurors. See State
v. Jefferson, 429 P.3d 467 (Wash. 2018) (finding the reasons the prosecutor gave for
excusing the juror, including that the juror exhibited a problematic attitude when they
indicated voir dire was a “waste of time,” combined with the juror’s other responses, was
likely pretext for intentional race discrimination). GR 37 could not be retroactively
applied to this case as the enaction occurred after the trial.
154
Gandy, supra note 148 (emphasis added).
155
Id.
156
ACLU Press Release, supra note 12.
157
Id.
158
Id.
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biases and have historically been used to exclude potential jurors of
color.159
B. How Other Courts and Legislators Have Applied and Referenced GR 37
Since Washington’s enactment of GR 37, courts and legislators in
Kansas, Iowa, Arizona, Oregon, Connecticut, and most recently California
have considered the rule’s impact on peremptory challenges and whether
there is a need to implement a similar court rule or piece of legislation.160 A
multitude of cases have also led Washington courts to reflect on why GR 37
was adopted and on the circumstances necessary for the rule to be
applicable to a given case.161
1. A Washington Case Brought Right After the Enactment of GR 37:
State v. Jefferson (2018)
In State v. Jefferson, the Washington Supreme Court examined whether
GR 37 applied to the case when Jefferson, an African-American defendant,
was convicted and the State used a peremptory strike against the only
African-American juror.162 In its decision, the court noted the specific
process of the rule’s enactment and that GR 37 was adopted to address how
to evaluate juror responses to determine “purposeful discrimination” and
issues of “unintentional, institutional, or unconscious” racial bias.163 The
Washington Supreme Court acknowledged the unique path for GR 37’s
enactment and also acknowledged that “GR 37 became effective April 24,
159

Id.
See State v. Jefferson, 429 P.3d 467 (Wash. 2018). See also State v. GonzalezSandoval, 431 P.3d 850 (Kan. 2018); State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319 (Iowa 2019); State
v. Gentry, 449 P.3d 707 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019); State v. Curry, 447 P.3d 7 (Or. Ct. App.
2019); State v. Holmes, 221 A.3d 407 (Conn. 2019); People v. Rhoades, 453 P.3d 89
(Cal. 2019).
161
See Jefferson, 429 P.3d at 467; see also State v. Berhe, 444 P.3d 1172 (Wash. 2019);
Karstetter v. King County Corrections Guild, 444 P.3d 672 (Wash. 2019); State v. Pierce
455 P.3d 647 (Wash. 2020).
162
Jefferson, 429 P.3d at 477.
163
Id.
160
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2018, and remains effective now, while Jefferson’s case is pending before
us on direct appeal.”164
GR 37 did not change the elements of Jefferson’s alleged crime or
anything about his potential punishment, nor did the rule attach new legal
consequences to Jefferson’s past acts.165 The Washington Supreme Court
ultimately determined that because Jefferson’s trial, voir dire, and the
Batson challenge all occurred before GR 37’s April 24, 2018, effective
date, the rule did not apply to the completed Batson challenge in Jefferson’s
case.166 Although the Washington Supreme Court found that GR 37 could
not be retroactively applied to the voir dire in Jefferson’s case, the
concurrence in part and dissent in part in Jefferson noted the necessity for a
court rule to fill in the gaps left open by Batson and address the issue of
race discrimination in jury selection, finding that “trial courts must ask if an
objective observer could view race as a factor in the use of the peremptory
challenge. In this case, an objective observer could view race as a factor in
the peremptory strike of Juror 10.”167 Jefferson implicated the necessity of
GR 37 and how the rule could positively impact race discrimination in voir
dire.
2. An Iowa Case Brought After the Enactment of GR 37: State v. Veal
(2019)
In State v. Veal, an African-American defendant was charged with
committing two murders, and although the jury venire contained five
164

Id. at 478.
Id. at 479.
166
Id. at 477. The Washington Supreme Court analyzed the rule of prospective
application and the rule that a newly enacted statute or court rule generally applies to all
cases pending on direct appeal to determine whether GR 37 could be retroactively
applied to Jefferson’s case. Ultimately, the Court determined that “the newly enacted
statute would only be applied to proceedings that occurred far earlier in the case if the
‘triggering event’ to which the new enactment might apply has not yet occurred,” but in
Jefferson’s case, the Batson challenge and jury selection had both occurred before GR 37
was enacted and became effective. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
167
Id. at 481.
165
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African-Americans, no African-American was seated on the jury because
the State exercised a peremptory strike on the remaining African-American
on the panel.168 Justice Brent Appel’s concurrence noted Washington’s
adoption of GR 37 and the fact that the rule regulates peremptory
challenges.169 Justice Appel’s concurrence further commented that because
African-Americans and other minorities make up such a small portion of
Iowa’s population, there is a greater need for a reexamination of the Batson
framework and preservation of the fair cross-section requirement.170
Although Justice Appel noted that Iowa recently revised fair cross-section
jurisprudence, the justice determined the need to ensure that “gains made
today are not eliminated by a Batson framework that permits the
elimination of African-American petit jurors through the back door of
peremptory challenges.”171 Veal indicates that there is a need across the
country for the implementation of a rule that addresses the current exclusion
of Black jurors and also the potential for such a rule to be utilized in Iowa.

VII. USING CALIFORNIA’S MOVE TOWARDS ENACTING ASSEMBLY
BILL 3070 AS AN EXAMPLE OF WHY WASHINGTON MUST
REEXAMINE GR 37 AND FURTHER PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
REFORM
This section and the following section will use California as an example
to show why Washington must learn from other states and remain an active
participant in achieving nationwide reform to peremptory challenges. First,
this section will focus on the demographic makeup of California in
comparison to Washington and discuss how California’s version of GR 37,
AB 3070, is needed because the more diverse a state’s incarcerated
population, the greater the need for a rule like GR 37. Next, this section will

168

State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319, 324 (Iowa 2019).
Id. at 358.
170
Id. at 359.
171
Id.
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examine how recent changes to California’s policies and laws as well as a
Supreme Court case support the implementation of AB 3070. This section
will then highlight the differences between the language for AB 3070 and
GR 37. Next, this section will examine other areas that Washington failed
to address with GR 37 and explain why a reexamination is needed. Finally,
this section will conclude by recommending another mechanism for
increasing juror diversity that Washington could employ in addition to
making amendments to GR 37’s current language.
A. How the Population Demographics of Washington Compare to the
Demographics of California and Why Changes Promoting Juror Diversity
Are Needed
Recent actions taken by the California State Legislature show that
California is already aware of the need for balanced and equitable juries.
California is following in Washington’s footsteps and has incorporated GR
37 into the state’s own piece of legislation.172 To guarantee that Sixth
Amendment rights to an impartial jury are honored, California passed GR
37-like legislation that also addresses purposeful discrimination that is
inherent in the state’s current jury selection practices.173 California is more
diverse than Washington and may have even more of a need for a court rule
or law that promotes juror diversity.
As of the 2010 Census, the State of Washington population was
6,724,540 with the following race and ethnic categories:174

172

A.B. 3070, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020).
See Senator Wiener Announces Bill, supra note 30; Gartrell, supra note 31; A.B.
3070, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020); SEMEL ET AL., supra note 11.
174
WASH. STATE OFF. OF FIN. MGMT.: WASHINGTON PROFILE OF GENERAL
DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERISTICS,
Table
DP-1
(2010),
https://www.ofm.wa.gov/sites/default/files/public/legacy/pop/census2010/dp1/data/state/
wa_2010_dp1_state_04000US53.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZX9-2HGE].
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White

Black or African-

Asian and

Hispanic or

Native

American

Pacific

Latino

American

Islander
77.3%

3.6%

and Other

15.2%

8.9%

0.9%

Although people of color represent a minority of the population in
Washington, they make up the majority of incarcerated individuals.175 In
2018, 37,000 Washington residents were incarcerated in various facilities.
The following table shows the incarceration rate in Washington per 100,000
residents of a given race or ethnicity:176
White

Black or African-

Hispanic

American

American
Indian/Alaska
Native

392

2,372

601

1,427

As of the 2010 Census, the State of California population was 37,253,956
with the following race and ethnic makeup:177
White

Black or

Other

American

Native

Two

African-

Asian

(Including

Indian

Hawaiian

or

American

Hispanic

and

and

More

and

Alaska

Other

Races

Latino)

Native

Pacific
Islander

57.59%

6.17%

13.05%

16.96%

0.97%

0.39%

4.87%

In California, as of 2010, people of color again represent the minority of the
population and as in Washington, they make up the majority of the

175

PRISON
POLICY
INITIATIVE,
Washington
State
Profile,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/WA.html [https://perma.cc/F3N8-PCWU].
176
Id.
177
STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., CALIFORNIA DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILES: CENSUS 2010,
http://www.dof.ca.gov/Reports/Demographic_Reports/Census_2010/#SF1
[https://perma.cc/NX3Q-LD8L].
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individuals who are incarcerated.178 As of 2018, there were 241,000
individuals incarcerated in the State of California. The following table
shows the incarceration rate in California per 100,000 residents of a given
race or ethnicity:179
White

Black or African-

Hispanic

American

American
Indian/Alaska
Native

453

3,036

757

996

In California Courts, “a total of 9,279 jury trials were recorded across all
case types. Jury trials held in the Superior Courts in [the] fiscal year of
2015–2016 included 4,822 felonies, 3056 misdemeanors, 1,142 civil
unlimited, 232 civil limited, and 27 probate and mental health cases.”180
California and Washington are similar in that in both states, people of color
represent the minority of the population but the majority of the individuals
who are incarcerated. Because most people who are incarcerated are people
of color, it is imperative that these individuals are given a jury that actually
reflects their peers. This is ultimately difficult in states like California and
Washington where the majority population is white; therefore, the
likelihood of an all-white jury is much higher. Changes promoting juror
diversity are needed to adhere to the Sixth Amendment and give those who
are being tried a truly impartial jury of their peers.
The disparities between incarceration rates of non-white and white
people in California and across the country may be due in part to racial
disparities in juror diversity and the impact that may have on rates of
conviction for different populations. Implicit bias in jury selection can often
178
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INITIATIVE,
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https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/CA.html [https://perma.cc/K6LZ-K8P3].
179
Id.
180
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 2017 COURT STATISTICS REPORT STATEWIDE
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TRENDS
2006-2007
THROUGH
2015-2016
(2017),
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2017-Court-Statistics-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7QJY-38SD].
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create a jury pool that is not indicative or representative of the population,
and a court rule that aims to increase jury diversity, like GR 37, is therefore
important in places where there are higher rates of incarceration. Without
such a court rule, attorneys can use peremptory challenges to remove jurors
for discriminatory reasons without giving an explanation or by using a
juror’s demeanor as a reason for the strike. Accused individuals who also
identify as members of an underrepresented population are more harshly
impacted by rules and procedures that have systematic racist effects and are
left without a representative jury of their peers.181 Due to the discriminatory
way peremptory challenges have been historically used, one can make the
connection that it is unlikely those who are now incarcerated were given a
truly impartial jury of their peers. To preserve the fair cross-section
requirement of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, it is imperative
that California and other states across the country reexamine the Batson
framework and prevent the exclusion of members of underrepresented
groups from the jury.
B. How GR 37 or a GR 37-Like Court Rule Could Impact the Make-Up of a
Jury
GR 37’s new process will impact the make-up of a jury by presenting
another hurdle that attorneys need to surmount in order to use a peremptory
challenge. Because attorneys will need to provide a justification for the
challenge that an objective observer would agree is not based on racial bias,
the attorney will have a more difficult time eliminating a juror based on
their race or ethnicity. As previously stated, some oft-used justifications,
such as demeanor-based justifications, are often coded language used to
exclude jurors for discriminatory purposes. Thus, GR 37 or a similar court
rule will provide an added barrier to attorneys attempting to exclude a juror
181

TASK FORCE ON RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, PRELIMINARY REPORT
RACE AND WASHINGTON’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2011),
http://www.law.seattleu.edu/x8777.xml [https://perma.cc/67BH-Z3DY].
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for a reason that is unrelated to their ability to be impartial and openminded.
GR 37’s new process will also require the court to carefully examine the
justifications attorneys are providing for their use of a peremptory
challenge. Courts will need to be able to discern when an attorney is using a
justification that is permeated with implicit and explicit biases. Without
close attention to the reasoning, discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges may prevail, leaving GR 37 moot. GR 37 or a similar court rule
thus has the potential to increase jury diversity if the rule is thoroughly
applied by all parties involved.
C. California Supreme Court Justice Liu and Berkley Law’s Death Penalty
Clinic Reference GR 37 and Push California to Follow Washington in
Enacting Peremptory Challenge Reform
The California Supreme Court has also acknowledged the need to
reexamine how peremptory challenges are used in California courts. On
November 25, 2019, California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu wrote
a strongly worded dissent highlighting Washington’s recently enacted GR
37 and the need for California to change its own discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges.182 In the case, People v. Rhoades, the prosecutor
summarily used four of their eight peremptory challenges to eliminate every
African-American seated in the jury box during voir dire for the penalty
retrial in a capital punishment case.183 The defendant raised a Batson
challenge, which the trial court denied.184
In his dissent, Justice Liu commented on the fact that the majority
opinion found no inference of discrimination after following the first step of
Batson.185 Instead, and most importantly, the court said, “the record

182

People v. Rhoades, 453 P.3d 89 (Cal. 2019).
Id. at 116–17.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 139 (Liu, J., dissenting).
183
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discloses readily apparent grounds for excusing each prospective juror,
dispelling any inference of bias that might arise from the pattern of strikes
alone.”186 Justice Liu also noted that such reasoning is common in other
cases and causes the Justices to hypothesize the potential reasons for
removal of underrepresented jurors rather than properly using the Batson
framework to produce actual answers to claims of discrimination prevalent
in the process of jury selection.187 Important to this Note is the fact that
Justice Liu highlighted Washington’s new GR 37 court rule and decisions
of other state high courts to essentially eliminate Batson’s first step.188
Clinical Professor of Law and Director of Berkley Law’s Death Penalty
Clinic Elisabeth Semel led the Death Penalty Clinic’s Class of 2020
students in researching and writing a report addressing California’s
perpetuation of discriminatory exclusion of Black and Latinx jurors from
the venire.189

Together, Semel and the law students wrote the report

Whitewashing the Jury Box.190 The report highlights empirical evidence
showing how implicit biases play a significant role in the exercise of
peremptory strikes, and it incorporates California appellate court opinions
to demonstrate this point further.191 The report also acknowledges
Washington’s leadership in enacting GR 37. Semel states unequivocally
that not only have California courts utterly failed to overturn a Batson case,
but the higher courts have also failed to even find a single trial court to have
committed an error in denying a defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s
use of a peremptory strike in over thirty years.192 The report concludes by
calling for the California Legislature to follow Washington’s leadership and

186

Id. (Liu, J., dissenting).
Id. (Liu, J., dissenting).
188
Id. at 148. (Liu, J., dissenting).
189
SEMEL ET AL., supra note 11.
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Id.
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Id. at v–viii, 12–27.
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Id. at vii–viii.
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pass AB 3070 to address the persistent discrimination in jury selection,
specifically in the usage of peremptory challenges.193
D. Differences Between California’s AB 3070 and Washington’s GR 37
AB 3070 Juries: Peremptory Challenges was introduced by Assembly
member Dr. Shirley K. Weber during the California Legislature’s 2019–
2020 Regular Session on February 21, 2020.194 AB 3070 is an addition to §
231.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure.195 On September 30, 2020, AB 3070
was signed by Governor Newsom and enacted.196
AB 3070 contains nearly identical language to GR 37 with some key
distinctions. For all jury trials beginning after January 1, 2022, AB 3070
prohibits any party from “using a peremptory challenge to remove a
prospective juror on the basis of the prospective juror’s race, ethnicity,
gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious
affiliation, or the perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of
those groups.”197 AB 3070 specifically includes gender, gender identity,
sexual orientation, national origin, and religious affiliation, which are left
out of GR 37. In Section 1(B), AB 3070 specifically notes the
disproportionate harm to African-Americans, Latinos, and other people of
color from the exercise of peremptory challenges and that proof of
intentional bias renders the current procedure for exercising a peremptory
strike ineffective.198 Washington’s GR 37 does not specify which racial
groups are often targeted by the discriminatory exercise of peremptory
challenges.
Another point of comparison between GR 37 and AB 3070 is their
limitations on the reasons for peremptory challenges in order to curb
193

Id. at ii, ix–xi, 71.
A.B. 3070, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020).
195
Id.
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Id.
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Id. (emphasis added).
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unconscious, implicit, and institutional biases. While both include certain
prohibitions on an attorney’s bases for making a peremptory challenge,
California’s AB 3070 goes much farther than GR 37. AB 3070 provides
nearly twice as many reasons where a peremptory challenge would be
presumptively invalid. In addition to the reasons included in GR 37, AB
3070 adds the following presumptively invalid reasons for exercising a
peremptory challenge:
(8) The ability to speak another language.
(9) Dress, attire, or personal appearance.
(10) Employment in a field that is disproportionately occupied by
members listed in subdivision (a) or that serves a population
disproportionately comprised of members of a group or groups
listed in subdivision (a).
(11) Lack of employment or underemployment of the prospective
juror or prospective juror’s family member.
(12) A prospective juror’s apparent friendliness with another
prospective juror of the same group as listed in subdivision (a).
(13) Any justification that is similarly applicable to a questioned
prospective juror or jurors, who are not members of the same
cognizable group as the challenged prospective juror, but were not
the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party. The
unchallenged prospective juror or jurors need not share any other
characteristics with the challenged prospective juror for
peremptory challenge relying on this justification to be considered
presumptively invalid.199
If the party exercising the peremptory strike can show that “an objective
reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective
juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national

199

Id. Compare WASH. CT. G.R. 37 (2018), with A.B. 3070, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2020) (specifically § 231.7(e)(8)–(13)).
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origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in those groups,”200
then the party may use one of the presumptively invalid reasons.
Neither California nor Washington included reasons pertaining to a
juror’s socioeconomic status as presumptively invalid for using a
peremptory

challenge.

Research

has shown

that

an

individual’s

socioeconomic status is closely connected to their race and ethnicity.201
Washington and California should both consider eliminating juror exclusion
based on implicit and explicit biases related to socioeconomic status
because socioeconomic status, race, and ethnicity are all intimately related.
Due to the connection between socioeconomic status, race, and ethnicity, it
is conceivable that without a prohibition on discriminatory strikes based on
socioeconomic status, a peremptory challenge could be used in reference to
someone’s income or class as a way to avoid explicitly acknowledging the
juror’s race.

VIII. METHODS FOR WASHINGTON TO STAY ACTIVE IN NECESSARY
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE REFORM
A. Washington Should Reexamine and Amend GR 37’s Language to Stay an
Active Reformer of Peremptory Challenges
California’s AB 3070 addresses several key categories that Washington
neglected to include in GR 37, such as implicit and explicit biases related to
a juror’s gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation. These
classifications do not prevent a juror from being impartial and are also often
used as means to make the jury less diverse.202 No individual should be
subjected to discrimination simply for performing their civic duty, and a
200

A.B. 3070, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020).
Ethnic and Racial Minorities & Socioeconomic Status, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N,
https://www.apa.org/pi/ses/resources/publications/minorities
[https://perma.cc/2AAUT9X5]; see David R. Williams & Selina A. Mohammed, Racism and Health I: Pathways
and Scientific Evidence, 57 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 1152–1173 (2013).
202
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding gender is an
unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality).
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potential juror’s gender identity, or sexual orientation is of no hinderance to
their ability to be impartial. A person’s gender or sexual orientation should
also not be used to make jury pools conform to the gender binary.
Washington should thus view gender identity and sexual orientation as
encompassed under the holding in J.E.B., though it would provide further
distinction and importance to have Washington specifically identify gender
identity and sexual orientation as included biases that the court rule
prohibits from peremptory challenge bases. Washington should also amend
GR 37 to include the other reasons for presumptively invalid peremptory
challenges that California included in AB 3070, such as implicit and
explicit biases related to a juror’s religious affiliation and national origin.
These classifications also do not prevent a juror from being impartial and
should therefore be included in GR 37 as presumptively invalid reasons for
excusing a juror.
In conducting research for this Note, I spoke to several Washington
attorneys and a superior court judge who told me that GR 37 is known by
attorneys but rarely used.203 In talking to King County Superior Court Judge
David Keenan, I began to wonder whether attorneys in Washington actually
understand GR 37 and have been specifically trained in how to use the rule
appropriately in court. The rare usage of GR 37 may be a result of the rule’s
recency and perhaps GR 37 will be used more frequently as attorneys’
familiarity increases. In addition to making the above changes to GR 37’s
language, Washington should offer opportunities for defense counsel and
prosecutors to have continuing legal education classes specifically focused
on GR 37 and peremptory challenges to facilitate such familiarity.
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B. Washington Should Implement Another Method to Address Batson’s
Shortcomings and to Further Improve Juror Diversity
Even with the enactment of GR 37, Washington must still look to find
other means of achieving juror diversity reform. One potential mechanism
for increasing juror diversity is to incentivize individuals to serve as a juror
by paying them at a higher rate. Currently, potential jurors may assert that
they have a financial hardship which prevents them from serving as a juror.
Financial hardships are especially prevalent if the individual is not
compensated for jury service by their employer or they are self-employed
and cannot afford to miss work in order to serve as a juror.204 The low juror
compensation of $10 per day in Washington has not been adjusted since
1959 and is believed to have a detrimental impact on prospective jurors and
to contribute to the underrepresentation of some populations in the jury
pool.205
The daily rate of juror compensation varies nationally and sometimes
includes travel expenses or mileage.206 Juror pay in state courts is
determined by each county or by state statute and can range from $0 per
day to $50 per day, with some states opting for a varied rate depending on
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the number of days of service.207 For example, in California, jurors are paid
$15 per day beginning on the second day of their service and each juror also
receives $0.34 per mile they travel to court.208 At the federal level, juror pay
is set by federal statute and funded by Congress.209 In 2018, Congress
increased the federal juror pay from $40 each day, which was well below
the federal minimum wage, to $50 per day.210 The bipartisan House
members supporting the increase stated, “[w]hile juror compensation was
never meant to serve as a substitute for a salary and obviously does not,
raising the daily rate of juror compensation to $50 per day would provide
some small relief for the sacrifices made by jurors.”211 The lawmakers
further asserted that the pay increase would hopefully lead to fewer jurors
seeking excuses from service and therefore improve both the efficiency and
empaneling of more representative juries.212
In contrast to federal jurors who are now paid $50 per day, jurors in
Washington state are only compensated $10 per day for their service.213 In
August of 2016, a lawsuit filed in King County claimed that the inadequate
expense payment to jurors was a contributing factor to the exclusion of
207
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people in poverty [or the indigent] and individuals from underrepresented
populations from the venire.214 Judges in King County and across the
country see the detrimental impact that undue financial hardships of sitting
on a jury can have in their courtrooms.215 “While no one keeps overall
statistics on juror excuses, those closest to the process say that in many
parts of the country, an increasing amount of jurors are trying to get out of
service due to economic hardship claims.”216 Juror pay is related to a
criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial because inadequate juror
compensation has a detrimental impact on a low-income individual’s ability
to serve as a juror.217 Low-income jurors may not be able to afford to take
time off, their employers may refuse to compensate them for time off, and
taking time off may put them at risk of losing their jobs.218 The result is an
underrepresentation of Black, Indigenous, and people of color in the jury
pool and a lack of an impartial jury. Enacting a court rule that addresses
Batson’s shortcomings for peremptory challenges is one method to help
increase juror impartiality, but Washington should also implement an
increase in juror pay to address the larger racial problems that are inherent
in the criminal justice system.

IX. CONCLUSION
Although GR 37’s immediate impact on peremptory challenges and the
jury selection process is unknown, there is hope that the discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges in Washington state will decrease substantially.
With GR 37, there is also hope that implicit bias in jury selection will
214

Evan Bush, How Washington Compares When it Comes to Paying Jurors, SEATTLE
TIMES (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/how-washingtoncompares-when-it-comes-to-paying-jurors/ [https://perma.cc/ES5N-4P2Y].
215
John Schwartz, Call to Jury Duty Strikes Fear of Financial Ruin, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/02/us/02jury.html [https://perma.cc/3PHHU7K5].
216
Id.
217
Khandelwal & Storms, supra note 205.
218
Id.

VOLUME 19 • ISSUE 1 • 2020

247

248 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

decrease and people of color will no longer be denied a jury of their peers.
Because of Washington’s leadership in combatting implicit biases prevalent
in the justifications prosecutors provide to defend their discriminatory
exercise of peremptory challenges, other states have taken note and begun
their own examinations of peremptory challenges. If other states follow a
similar process to Washington and California and ultimately choose to
incorporate implicit biases into their peremptory challenge rules, the states
will hopefully see a rise in jury venires that are representative of the
population and a fall in discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.
It is likely that GR 37 and similar court rules will only be the start of
what is needed to actually address the inequities in jury selection and
inherent biases that exist throughout the criminal justice system. However,
Washington’s leadership in addressing Batson’s shortcomings and its
openness to learning from the methods and language used by other states is
one small way that change can occur. We are well past the time when
implicit and intentional biases need to be eliminated from jury selection,
and we owe it to all who are accused to let their case be heard by an
impartial jury of their peers. By confronting the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges head on, we begin to effectuate the original intention
of the Sixth Amendment and give those who are accused an impartial jury
of their peers.
With the multitude of ensuing changes to peremptory challenges in
California and other states across the country, Washington must not be
complacent and must instead remain an active participant in preventing the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges and in renewing belief in
judicial integrity.219 The onus is now on Washington to learn from the
changes other states are making to peremptory challenges, to address GR
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37’s shortcomings, to make new suggestions for GR 37 implementation,
and to push for a truly impartial jury once and for all.

VOLUME 19 • ISSUE 1 • 2020

249

250 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

